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Abstract 
Purpose-This study evaluates the connection between Corporate Governance and Value relevance of accounting 
information for firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. It sought to ascertain the effectiveness of corporate 
governance by demonstrating a link between corporate governance and firm valuation. 
Design/Methodological/Approach-The paper employed the Ohlson valuation model and variants of the model, 
using adjusted R2 as measures of value relevance.  The paper used board, audit committee and external audit 
variables as indicators of corporate governance. The sample consisted of forty-five(45) listed firms over the 
period 2008 to 2015.  
Findings- results shows that accounting information is value relevant on the Nigerian market, however presently  
corporate governance practices does not lead to perceptible increase in the value relevance of accounting 
information.  
Research limitation/implication-this paper provides evidence that corporate governance has not improved the 
quality of accounting information in Nigeria, a result which contradicts the evidence from other countries. The 
Nigerian context implies that indicators of corporate governance quality from empirical literature do not address 
the problem of corporate governance in Nigeria.  
Originality/value-the paper determines the effect of corporate governance on value relevance of accounting 
information, using the relationship of accounting information with share price as indicator of quality of 
accounting information. The implication therefore is that efficient capital allocation will improve if the quality of 
corporate governance is improved  
Keywords: Value Relevance, Corporate Governance, Accounting information, Nigeria 
 
Introduction  
The primary objective of financial statements is to provide information for investment decision making. The 
quality of decision is driven by the quality of information at the disposal of the decision maker, consequently by 
the quality of information contained within the financial statements. The frame work of presentation and 
preparation of financial statement issued by the IFRS (2003) states that the objective of financial statements is to 
provide information as to the financial position, financial performance and changes in the financial performance 
of the entity. Also to enable management render stewardship for their management of entity’s resources.  
For accounting information to be useful it must possess certain qualitative characteristics. These are 
attributes of accounting information which make them useful to a broad range of users. The Framework of the 
IFRS states that information must possess such features as faith representation , relevance, comparability and 
understandability. In order to empirically operationalise relevance, accounting scholarship resort to value 
relevance. It is the extent to which accounting information summarise information that is summarised in share 
values. The higher the proportion of such information summarised by accounting information the stronger the 
value relevance of accounting information, hence the more useful it is to the user from the perspective of 
relevance. 
Financial statement represents the medium of communications between the reporting entity and the 
investing public and a range of users of accounting information. The essential separation of ownership from 
management creates an agency problem, that is an asymmetry of interest between management and shareholders. 
This referred to as agency conflict. One device for mitigating agency conflict is to reduce the level of 
information asymmetry between shareholders and owners. This is attained by the provision of accounting 
information of high quality to shareholders. That is accounting information that captures the underlying value 
generating capacity of the reporting entity. That information must be one that faithfully represents the 
fundamentals of the entity as a value generating business. In order words information that posses the qualitative 
characteristics as outlined in the framework of the IFRS. 
From the dimension of practice, issues and doubts have been raised as to the quality of information 
contained in the financial statements of reporting entities in Nigeria, especially Nigerian listed companies. A 
review of corporate history in Nigeria shows a catalogue of corporate scandals and collapse. Most prominent and 
consequential for the Nigerian economy is the developments in the banking industry. Several commentators have 
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adduced this to poor corporate governance (Sanusi, 2008 
Koh, Laplante and Tong(2007) state that good corporate governance structures create value by provision of 
value-relevant information in the market place. In the light of the foregoing examining how corporate 
governance influence value relevance of accounting information in Nigeria, assumes an empirical imperative. 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern company, the platform for economic activities has 
consequences for the way the firm is organised. Jensen and Meckling (1976) states that this separation results in 
conflict of interest amongst the various stakeholders of the modern firm. The nature of conflict varies between 
the different stakeholders in the firm. In this nexus the conflict between shareholders and management, differs 
from that between bondholders and equity. It also differs between controlling shareholding and non-controlling 
shareholding. The complexion of the conflict derives from the capital contribution and the return each 
stakeholders receives from the firm. Agency theory in the light of the nature of these conflicts categorise this into 
four broad classes: managerialism, conflict between shareholders and management; asymmetric information, 
between large, insider shareholding and minority outsiders, outside shareholders; debt agency, between debt 
holders and shareholders and other agency conflict between managers and other parties interacting with the firm. 
All stakeholders are driven by self-interest, whose unfettered behaviour detract from the efficient running of the 
firm and undermining value creation by the firm. 
Corporate governance exist as a device to address the consequence arising from separation of ownership 
from control (Shleifer&Vishny, 1997). Governance mechanisms can be broadly divided into internal and 
external mechanisms, though interacting in abating the agency problems (Jensen &Meckling, 1976). The internal 
mechanisms include board composition and structure, financial policies, allocation of ownership. External 
mechanisms include takeovers and mergers, managerial labour market and product market (Jensen, 1993). 
Gillian (2006) notes that external mechanisms carry some cost and are limited in effectively dealing with agency 
problems. 
The Nigerian corporate reporting system offers a distinctive environment for evaluating the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on value relevance of accounting information. In Nigeria external governance 
mechanisms are relatively weak compared to the US and the UK. Here the market for corporate control is not as 
active as those in advanced markets, and its effectiveness in propelling enhanced board monitoring and taking 
remedial actions in cases of firm failure are not comparable. In this nexus the case for strong internal governance 
mechanisms is enhanced. This study is uniquely placed to address how such internal governance mechanism as 
board structure, audit committee structures influence the quality of accounting information indicated by value 
relevance of such information. 
Extant literature on corporate governance is both expansive and diversed.  (Cohen, et al, 2004). However 
empirical literature focusing on corporate governance impact on value relevance of accounting information is 
largely uncharted. There are no definitive studies that have addressed the way and manner corporate governance 
contribute to value relevance of accounting information, especially for relatively poor corporate governance 
environment like Nigeria. 
Information asymmetries that arise from the separation of ownership from control, can be exploited by 
managers to engage in value destroying opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Where the 
monitoring of management is weak, due to shareholder atomism or lack of expertise, managers could mislead 
outsiders by the provision of financial information which do not capture the fundamental value generating 
capacity of the firm. Agency theory posit that effective corporate governance can lead to improved financial 
reporting. Functional corporate governance mechanism constrain the opportunistic behaviour of management, 
eliminating the incentive to engage in same. This position is anchored on the fact that effective corporate 
governance enhances the discharge of stewardship by management and financial reports represents the 
communication of that effective stewardship. 
In the light of the foregoing the basic problem which this study seeks to provide answers to is the degree to 
which corporate governance influences the association of firm value with accounting information, that is the 
value relevance of accounting information. 
This study is divided into five sections. Section one is the introduction, section two is review of relevant 
literature; section three focuses on the methodology; section four is data presentation and analysis and section 
five draws the conclusion. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
Issues of corporate governance (CG) have received more attention than it would ordinarily have as a result of a 
series of corporate failures. Corporate collapses like Enron Corporation (US), Barings Empire (UK) and in 
Malaysia cases such as Perwaja and Pan Electric Inc., the bank collapse in Nigeria are all rooted in the lack of a 
proper governance system. Corporate governance has received increasing emphasis both in practice and in 
academic research (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee Report 1999; Ramsay Report 2001; Sarbanes-Oxley 2002; 
Bebchuk and Cohen 2004). 
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Corporate Governance is the interaction between various participants (shareholders, board of directors, and 
company’s management) in shaping corporation’s performance and the way it is preceding towards. Its emphasis 
is on the relationship between the owners and the managers in an organization. Corporate Governance deals with 
the manner the providers of finance guarantee themselves of getting a fair return on their investment. An 
important theme of corporate governance is the nature and extent of accountability of managers of the business.. 
It ensures transparency which ensures strong and balanced economic development. This also ensures that the 
interests of all shareholders (majority as well as minority shareholders) are safeguarded. It ensures that all 
shareholders fully exercise their rights and that the organization fully recognizes their rights. 
An even broader definition is that corporate governance is the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-
post bargaining over the quasi rent generated by the firm. This definition emphasizes on the appropriation claims; 
it can be expanded to include the complex set of constraints that determine the quasi-rents generated by the firm 
in course of relationship and to shape the ex post bargaining over them. This definition implies the determination 
of the value added by the firm and allocation of this surplus value among stakeholders that have a relationship 
with the firm. 
In consonance with this broad definition, the objective of a good corporate governance framework would be 
to maximize the contribution of the firm to the overall economy, including all stakeholders. Under this definition, 
corporate governance would include the relationship between shareholders, creditors, and corporations: between 
financial markets, institutions, and corporations; and between employees and the corporations.  Corporate 
governance would also encompass corporate social responsibility, including all aspects of the firm’s dealing with 
respect to culture and the environment. 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance and the Value Relevance of Accounting Information linkage 
All public firms issue financial reports, but the quality of the reports differs across firms. In order to enhance the 
integrity of financial reporting, it is required of a company to put in place a structure of review and authorization 
designed to ensure the truthful and factual presentation of a company’s financial position (corporate 
governance).The corporate governance structure should include a process to ensure the independence and 
competence of the company’s external auditors and an audit committee that will review and consider the 
financial statements. 
Corporate governance and financial accounting information are distinct concepts. However, both interrelate 
in the global marketplace. An important aspect of corporate governance lies in the fact that a company seeks to 
safeguard the interests of its financiers, such as lenders, suppliers and shareholders. One way of preserving 
business partners' interests is the publication of accurate and complete financial documentation on a regular 
basis.. Financial reporting is an important element of the system of corporate governance, and some failures of 
corporate governance may therefore be due to inadequate financial reports. On the other hand, some problems of 
the financial reporting process (such as possible lack of auditor independence) may have their origins in 
deficiencies of the system of corporate governance. 
Good quality of corporate governance structures creates value by providing value-relevant accounting 
information in the marketplace (Koh et al., 2007). Better structured governance mechanisms should result in 
better quality financial reporting in the marketplace. 
Shareholders demand financial reporting from managers in order to evaluate the performance of managers. 
However, in the absence of strong monitoring mechanisms on managerial behaviour, managers could mislead 
outsiders by providing financial information which does not portray the true underlying performance of the 
business. In such cases, accounting information is of little use in valuing companies, and no association between 
market price and accounting information would be expected. Corporate governance mechanisms are assumed to 
constrain management opportunistic earnings behaviour and, consequently, to make accounting information 
more credible and relevant to outsiders. 
Corporate governance ensures that financial information presented to outsiders reflects the underlying 
business operations and is not opportunistically biased. A firm’s corporate governance mosaic composed of the 
board of directors, AC members, and institutional ownership, these are mechanism for providing high quality 
accounting information by constraining managerial-earnings management activities. 
The conceptual framework of the International Financial Reporting Standard states that two fundamental 
characteristic of useful accounting information are relevance and faithful representation. Accounting information 
is considered relevant if it has the capacity to make a difference in the decision of the financial statement user. 
The empirical operationalization of the attribute of relevance is referred to as value relevance.  
The theoretical framework for empirical determination of the relevance of accounting information was laid 
by Ohlson (1995). The model specifies a conceptual linkage between firm value and accounting information of 
earnings and book value. There are three fundamental assumptions of the model.  Present Value relations – 
states value of equity is the PV of future dividends discounted at Risk free rate. This is based on the dividend 
discount model (DDM). Clean Surplus Relations – which assumes that any change in book value of  equity 
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must be reported either as accounting earnings or dividends. Linear info dynamics – which imposes a time-
series structure on abnormal earnings (relation btw current and next period earnings ) as linear and stationary.  
The fundamental assumptions of the Ohlson model does not take into account the factor of managerial 
incentive to maximize their personal wealth, their opportunistic behavior that could result to preparation of 
biased financial statements. Agency theory posit that the separation of ownership from control give rise to 
agency conflict between managers and owners. The effect of the conflict is the creation of information 
asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders (Jensen &Meckling, 1976). Extant studies have 
documented resource mis-allocation where users fail to detect poor quality financial reports. Beneish(1997) 
shows that trading strategies based on opportunistic GAAP lead to significant abnormal returns. The mitigation 
of sub-optimal managerial decision making or managerial opportunism can be attained by product market 
competition, where pure market forces are at work, which in practice hardly exist. The implication therefore is 
that governance structures may prove to be veritable mechanism to address managerial opportunism. Corporate 
governance structures as the board of directors, ownership structures, Audit Committee and audit quality may to 
some extent help. Effective corporate governance from literature can be hypothesized as a driving force for 
quality accounting information.  
There are two ways this is attained. The provision of high quality accounting information help check the 
opportunistic management behavior. Accounting earnings are less useful where managers engage on earnings 
management for opportunistic objectives. The existence of effective corporate governance structure may to some 
reduce the misalignment of interest of managements and shareholders. Consequently mangers are less prone to 
acting sub-optimally providing accounting information which captured the value generating capacity of the firm. 
Extant studies Klien (2002) show that discretionary accruals are negative variants of corporate governances 
structures such as board independence and Audit committee. Davidson et al (2005) also show that the likelihood 
of earnings management is negatively related to fraction of non-executive directors and audit committee. Brown 
and Caylor (2006) find that value creation is positive related to two important governance categories of board of 
directors and board remuneration.  
Another channel by which corporate governance drive high quality accounting information is the interaction 
of corporate governance and corporate disclosure, the extent of disclosure can impact positively on value 
relevance of accounting information. Increased disclosure reduce the level of information asymmetry, curbing 
opportunities for managerial opportunism. Studies show that CEO duality in firms lead to less voluntary 
disclosure relative to firms where the CEO is separate from Chairman of the board.  
 
3.Research design and methodology 
The population of this study consist of 45 listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange from the 2009 through to 
2016, resulting in 360 firm-years observation. The choice of listed firms is predicated on the identification of 
share price as an objective measure of value for quoted firms. As enunciated in finance literature, the primary 
objective of the firm is to maximise the wealth of shareholders. For quoted firms wealth accretion of 
management of the firms is reflected in the share prices of such firms. It is also imperative to note that listed 
firms are bound to subscribe to corporate governance code of the Stock Exchange. The agency problem manifest 
in listed firms, because of the clear separation of ownership from control. In the listed firms the various 
complexion of the agency problems can be seen. Firms are included in the sample when they meet the criteria 
listed below. 
• Firms listed in the exchange between 2009 and/or no longer listed as of 31st December, 2016 to ensure the 
availability of the data for the period under consideration 
• Firms not providing consolidated financial statement, to ensure the homogeneity of financial statements 
• Not closing the financial statement on 31 December, to ensure homogeneity of the date of closure and 
relevant consistency with Nigerian Stock Exchange capitalisation 
• That did not provide all necessary information for the analysis 
• Banks and insurance companies as their financials are somewhat different from other sectors. 
 .  
3.1 Model Specification 
In consonance with extant value relevance literature this study employs the Ohlson (1995) model in determining 
the value relevance of accounting information. The Ohlson (1995) model which conceptually links accounting 
information to firmvalue 
The regression model takes the following form: 
  Pit = 0+ 1EPSit + 2BVit + εit     (1) 
where Pit is share price of firm i at 3months after end of accounting year t. EPSit is net earnings after tax per 
share of firm i at the end of year t.  BVit is book value per share of firm i at the end of year t. The use of share 
price  3 months after year end is to allow for the resolution of documented inefficiencies of the market 
(Osamwonyi&Anikamdu, 2002; Osaze, 2007).   
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Corporate governance mechanisms are broadly categorised into two. They are external corporate governance 
mechanisms and internal corporate governance mechanisms. Since all firms are confronted with the same 
external environment, what determines the degree of impact of corporate governance on value relevance of 
accounting information, are the peculiar nature of internal corporate governance mechanisms. To this end we 
focus on board and audit committee characteristics. Our concentration on these is anchored on existing studies. 
Cohen, Krishnanmoorthy, and Wright (2004) state that the preponderance of studies on the connection between 
value relevance of accounting information and corporate governance focus on board and audit committee 
characteristics. We also note that the intensity and potency of external corporate governance mechanisms in 
Nigeria is weak. The market for corporate control is insubstantial. The implication of this is that the kind of anti-
takeover measures put in place in advanced markets like the US are largely unobtainable in Nigeria.  
Corporate Governance variables employed in this study are defined below: 
• Board independence – measured as the ratio of number of independent directors of the board to total 
board size 
• Board size – measured by actual number of persons on the board 
• Board political connection- indicated as 1 if a board member has national award otherwise  0 
• Foreign participation in the board – is coded 1 if a foreigner is on the board otherwise 0 
• Board ownership – the proportion of shares owned by board members relative to the total number of 
shares outstanding 
• Audit committee size – indicated by the actual number of persons in the audit committee. 
• Audit committee independence – ratio of independent AC members to the size of the audit committee. 
• Audit committee financial literacy –measured as the ratio of AC having financial literacy to the size of 
audit committee 
• Big 4 audit (BIG 4) – assigned a value of 1 if the firm uses any of the big 4 audit firm, otherwise a value 
of 0  
• Non-audit fees – proxied by the residuals of the model  of audit fees with size of the sample firms.  
In this study in order to determine how corporate governance impacts upon the value relevance of 
accounting information, we employ the technique of Principal Component Analysis. Following Habib and Azim 
(2006) the corporate governance variable in this study were  grouped into three main classes The three factors 
extracted from the matrix solution are categorised into STRUCTURE factors which represents Board and Audit 
Committee structure. The second category will be that of INDEPENDENCE which captures the independence 
characteristics of both the board and audit committee and lastly AUDIT QUALITY (AQ) which captures the 
audit quality dimension.  
It is the factors scores from the three categories discussed above that are employed in the regression model 
to determine how corporate governance affects value relevance of accounting information.  
Deriving from the above process, the regression model  (1) is modified with the inclusion of the PCA scores 
of the three derived corporate governance variables to give us model (2) 
Pit = α0 + α1EPSit + α2BVit + α3STRit + α4INDPit + α5AQit + εit   (2) 
Model (3) shows the interaction effect of the corporate governance variables in order to establish the effect 
of corporate governance on value relevance of accounting information.  
Pit = α0 + α1EPSit + α2BVit + α3STRit + α4INDPit + α5AQit + α6EPS*STRit+ α7EPS*INDPit + α8EPS*AQit + 
α9BV*STRit + α10 BV*INDPit + α11BV*AQ + εit        (3)The variables in the models above are measured as 
follows : EPS=earnings per share; BV= book value per share;  STR= Board and Audit Committee structure 
factor score;  INDP = Board and Audit Committee independence factor score AQ= Audit quality factor score 
Extant literature show that value relevance of accounting information is affected by fundamental economic 
factors. In order to isolate the effect of corporate governance on value relevance of accounting information, there 
is the need to control for these company specific factors (Habib &Azim, 2008). Company specific factors 
identified in previous literature are profitability, size, growth opportunities and leverage (Collins et al, 1997). 
The regression model shown below captures the implication of the control variables on value relevance of 
accounting information. 
We also employ an interaction model in which the various corporate governance mechanism interact in 
influencing value relevance of accounting information 
Pit=  β0 + β1EPSit +β2BVit+β3Dlossit+β4SIZEit+ 
β5LEVit+β6GROWTHit+β7EPS*Dlossit+β8EPS*SIZEit+β9EPS*GROWTHit+β10BV*Dlossit+β11BV*
SIZEit + β12BV*LEVit + β13BV*GROWTHit + + εit     (4) 
Where : 
• Pit = Share price at three (3) months after end of accounting year;  LEV = leverage is the ratio of 
(short term debt + long term debt/total assets; Dloss =    dummy variable takes a value of 1 if EPS is 
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negative and otherwise 0;  SIZE = is the natural logarithm of Total Assets; GROWTH =is the ratio 
of Market value of Equity/Book value of Equity at the end of the year                       
• The final regression model taking into cognisance the effect of the control variables in determining 
how corporate governance affects value relevance of accounting information is indicated in model 
(4) below: 
• Pit = α0 + α1EPSit + α2BVit + α3STRit + α4INDPit + α5AQit + α6EPS*STRit+ α7EPS*INDPit + 
α8EPS*AQit + α9BV*STRit + α10 BV*INDPit + α11BV*AQ + β3Dlossit+β4SIZEit+ 
β5LEVit+β6GROWTHit+β7EPS*Dlossit+β8EPS*SIZEit+β9EPS*GROWTHit+β10BV*Dlossit+  
β11BV*SIZEit + β12BV*LEVit + β13BV*GROWTHit + + εit(4) 
 
4.1 Empirical Results  
The data used in the analysis consist of 45 firms quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2015 a 
period of eight years. The sample covers all industries excluding firms in financial industry.   
Insert table 1 
Table 1 provides a summary statistics of firms based on the industry sector class in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. The corporate governance and accounting data were collected primarily from the financial statements 
of the sample firms, Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact book and Nigeria Stock Exchange daily price quotation. 
Share price data 3 and 6 months after year end is collected daily from share price quotation. Accounting 
data extracted from financial statements and supplemented by NSE fact book. 
Insert table 1 here 
Table 1above shows the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance variables employed in the study. 
Board size has a maximum number of 16, a minimum of 3. The mean board size is 8.9 and standard deviation of 
2.57. Non-executive board membership has mean value of 5.98 and median value of 6. The maximum non-
executive board membership is 2.02, with maximum and minimum values at 12 and 1 respectively. Audit 
committee has a maximum number of 6 and a minimum of 3, with mean and median values at 5.53 and 6 
respectively. Audit committee financial literacy has a mean and median value of 0.58 an 0 respectively, with 
standard deviation of 0.97. Non-executive audit committee membership has a mean value of 2.12 and a median 
value of 2, with standard deviation of 0.7. and Political connection of board members has maximum value of 3 
and minimum value of 1, with mean and median values at 0.96 and 1 respectively and the maximum and 
minimum values at 3 and 0 respectively 
Foreign board membership has a maximum value of 8 and minimum value of 2, with the mean and median 
values at 2.2 and 2 respectively, the standard deviation has a value on 2.07. Board independence has a mean 
value of 0.68 and a median value of 0.7, with standard deviation at 0.15. The mean board shareholding is 
68.2million shares with median value at 10.02million shares and a standard deviation of 172million shares. 
Audit fee of sample firms has a mean value of N14.16million and a median value of N5.75million, with the 
standard deviation at 28.24million. The Jacques-Bera statistics for most of the variables are high and easily pass 
the test of at 5 per cent. Indicating that we reject the hypothesis of normality for the probability distribution of 
the data. This means that the data are quite heterogeneous, manifesting dispersed individual features of sample 
firms. This heterogeneity is not however manifest in the data for non-executive board membership and non-
executive audit committee membership. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 4.2 above shows the descriptive statistics of the accounting information extracted from the financial 
statements of sample firms in the study. The mean EPS of sample firm over the period 2008 to 2015 is 1.98 and 
median at 0.71, with standard deviation at 5.5 suggesting a high level of variability among EPS of sample firms. 
Book value per share (BVPS) has a mean of 8.85 and a median of 4.35, with a standard deviation of 16.04, much 
higher than the mean. The positive value of skewness, suggest data distribution to the right of the mean value. 
Dividend per share (DPS) has a mean value of 34.8k and a median value of 0.12k, with standard deviation of 
119.8k, these value indicate strong heterogeneity amongst the sample firms, which is corroborated by the JB 
statistics, that supports the rejection of normality of data at 5 per cent. Cash flow per share (CFOPS) has a mean 
value 3.17, with a median and standard deviation of 0.81 and 6.21 respectively. The JB-statistics is quite high, 
meaning we can reject the hypothesis of normality. In summary, the data of exhibit a strong level of 
heterogeneity across the sample firms. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 3 above shows the correlation coefficient of the variables employed in the study. An examination of 
the table shows that no value exceeds 0.5, meaning that the correlation amongst the variables is weak. This gives 
some assurances that the model does not suffer from the problem of auto correlation. The relationship between 
corporate governance variables in the study and the accounting and control variables are weak. Structure has 
negative relationship with independence, loss, and growth. But has positive relationship with other variables. 
Independence (INDP) has negative relationship with audit quality (AQ), EPS,DPS, CFOPS, BVPS, DEBT and 
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Share price. Audit quality (AQ) has negative relationship with the control variables of LOSS and GRW.  
  
4.2 Analysis of regression results 
The regression analysis is undertaken with the dependent variable taken at 3months after year end, in order to 
take into account the inefficiency of the market. As opined by Dung(2008), using prices some time after year end 
has the advantage of impounding more fully the accounting information at year end. The inefficiency of the 
market demands the passage of time to afford the resolution of the inefficiency of the market in accommodating 
accounting information released after year end. 
Insert table5 here 
Table 5 above shows the results of the basic regression with share price at 3 months after year end (shp1) as 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables as earnings (EPS) book value (BVPS), cash flow from 
operation (CFOPS) and dividends (DPS). In model 1 the results shows the adjusted R2 at 0.532, with F-stat at 
130.6 (p-value=0). This shows that about 53% of the variations in share value is explained by the independent 
variables and the model has good explanatory power. The coefficients of earnings and book value are positive 
and significant at 1%. In model 2 the explanatory variables are earnings, book value and cash flow. Adjusted R2 
is 0.567, that is they explain about 57% of the changes in share prices. Coefficient of the regressors are positive 
and significant at 1%. In model 3 we include dividend as a variable following Brief (2000). The regression result 
from this model shows that both earnings and book value are positive and significant but dividend is not. 
Adjusted R2 is 0.533, with f-stat at 98.7(p-value=0) 
Insert Table 6 here 
Table 6 above shows the results of the regression models 4,5 and 6. These models are variants of model 1,2, 
and 3 in which the corporate governance variables included in the models. Regression results of model 4 shows 
that the Adjusted R2 at 0.54, and the f-stat at 69.16 (p-value=0). Earnings and book value are positively related to 
share price in the presence of corporate governance variables, however they are not significant. Only audit 
quality (AQ) of the corporate governance variable is significant at 5%. In model 5, which is model 2, with 
corporate governance variables included, the adjusted R2 is 0.57, not different from the result of model 2. The 
coefficients of the explanatory variables show that earnings, book value, cash flow and independence dimension 
of corporate governance are positively related to share price and significantly so at 5 per cent. Model 6 is the 
model 3 with corporate governance variables included. Adjusted R2 is 0.54, marginally different from that of 
model 3. The coefficients of the variables shows that only the audit quality dimension of corporate governance is 
significant at 5 per cent. All other variables are positively associated with share price except for independence 
dimension , however they fail test of significant even at 10 per cent.  
INSERT TABLE 7 
Table 7 above shows the result of regression model 7,8 and 9. These models are variants of model 4,5 and 6, 
in which the accounting variables are allowed to interact with the corporate governance variables. The results 
from model 7 shows that BVPS and AQ are significant at 5 per cent, while EP*STR and BVPS*INDP are also 
significant at 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively. All other accounting variables are positively associated with 
share price do not pass the test of significance. The same applies to corporate governance variables of STR and 
INDP which are negatively and positively associated with share price, but not significant even at 10 per cent. In 
the interaction of the variables, earnings interacting with structure and independence are negatively associated 
with share price. Book value interacting with independence and audit quality is negatively related with share 
price but not significant. The adjusted R2 is 0.62, which quite higher than that of model 1, with f-stat of 48 (p-
value=0) indicating that the model has a goodness of fit. 
The regression result from model 8 a variant of model 2, shows that CFOPS is positively associated with 
share price and it is significant at 5 per cent. Earnings and book value are positively related to share price but do 
not pass the test of significance even at 10 per cent. The corporate governance variable of AQ is positively 
related to share price and significant at 5 per cent. Structure is negatively related to share price, but independence 
is positively related, though both are not significant at 10 per cent. In the interaction of the variables the 
interaction of earnings with structure and independence, is negatively associated with share price but the 
interaction with audit quality is positively related. Earnings interaction with corporate governance variables is 
not however significant. Book value interaction with structure is negatively related to share price and significant 
at 5 per cent. BVPS interaction with other corporate governance variables is not significant even at a loose 10 
per cent. Cash flow interaction with INDP and AQ is negatively associated with share price though not 
significant, while the interaction of cash flow with structure is positively related to share price but not significant. 
The adjusted R2 from this model is 0.63 higher than that of model 2. The results from model 9 shows that book 
value is significantly related to share price at 5 per cent, but other accounting variables are positively related to 
share price but not significantly so. From the corporate governance variables we find that audit quality is 
positively associated with share price and pass the test of significance at 5 per cent. The interaction of earnings 
and with structure and audit quality is significant at 5 per cent. Book value interaction with structure is positively 
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associated with share price and significant at 1 per cent. Dividend interaction with corporate governance 
variables fail the test of significance even at a liberal 10 per cent. The adjusted R2 from the model is 0.63, higher 
than the adjusted R2 of model 3.  
INSERT Table 8 
Table 8 above shows the regression results of model 10, 11 and 12 which capture the differential valuation 
consequences of accounting information in the context of the control variables of LOSS, SIZE, GROWTH and 
DEBT. The control variables are included in the study in order to properly isolate the effects of corporate 
governance on value relevance of accounting information. Extant studies show that firm profitability, size, 
growth and debt are firm specific factors that affect the degree to which accounting information is value relevant 
(Collis, Maydew& Weiss, 1997) 
The results from model 10 shows that LOSS, DEBT and GRW are negatively related to share price and 
significant at 5 per cent, but SIZE is positively associated with share price however it is not significant. The 
interaction of earnings and loss is positively and significantly associated with share price at 5 per cent. There is a 
also a significant and positive association between EPS*DEBT and share price at 5 per cent. The adjusted R2 is 
0.94. The regression results from model 11, reveals that the earnings and book value are positively associated 
with share price, but cash flow is negatively related. However non of the accounting variables is significant in its 
association with share price. For the control variables only size is positive in its association with share price, 
others are negatively related but non is significant in relationship with share price. In the interaction of 
accounting variables with control variables, we find that only BVPS*GRW is significantly and positively related 
to share price at 1 per cent. The adjusted R2 from this model is 0.94 
The results from model 12 shows that no accounting variable is significant in its association with share 
price at even 10 per cent. While earnings and book value are positively related to share price, dividend is 
negatively related. Like model 11, all the control variables are insignificant in relation with share price. Of the 
control variable only GRW is positively associated with share price. In the interaction of the control variables 
with accounting variables, the interaction of book value and growth is positive in association with share price 
and it is significant at 1 per cent. All other interactions are not significant in relations with share price. The 
adjusted R2 from the model is 0.94 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
Table 9 above shows the results of the regression of model 13. The model shows the basic accounting 
information of earnings and book value, together with corporate governance variables and control variables. The 
interaction of accounting variables with corporate governance variables and control variables is also included in 
the model. The accounting variables of earnings and book value are positively related to share price, however not 
significant even at 10 per cent. For the corporate governance variables, audit quality is positive in its relationship 
with share price, but structure and independence are negatively related to share price. The corporate governance 
variables are however not significant in relationship with share price. The control variables are all negatively 
related with share price but are not significant at a liberal 10 per cent level. The interaction of accounting 
variables with corporate governance variables reveal that earnings interaction with corporate governance 
variables are negatively associated with share price but do not pass the test of significance at 10 per cent. The 
same applies to book value and corporate governance variables which the fail the test of significance, though 
BVPS*STR is positive. For the control variables, they are all negatively related to share price however they fail 
the test of significance even at a liberal 10 per cent. The interaction of accounting variables with control 
variables, shows that only the interaction between book value and growth pass the test of significance at 5 per 
cent. All other interactions do not manifest significance in relationship with share price. The adjusted R2 is 0.94, 
with the DW stat at 2.06. 
The regression result from model 14 shows that earnings and cash flow are negatively associated with firm 
value but not significant. Book value is positively associated with firm value and also not significant. 
Independence and audit quality dimension of corporate governance are positively related to firm value but lack 
significance, which structure dimension is negatively associated with firm value and also is insignificant. The 
interaction of accounting variables and corporate governance are positively associated with firm value except for 
EPS*STR, EPS*INDP and CFOPS*AQ, however not one of these interaction is significant at 10 per cent. Of the 
control variables only DEBT is negatively related to firm value and significant at 5 per cent. The interaction of 
accounting variables with control variables also show insignificance in relationship with firm value, except for 
BVPs*GRW and CFOPS*DEBT, which pass the test of significance at 1 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. 
The adjusted R2 is 0.95, with DW stat at 2.11. 
The regression result from model 15 shows that the accounting variables are positively related to share price, 
but are not significantly related to share price. Structure and independence dimension of corporate governance 
are negatively associated with share price but lack significance in this relationship. Audit quality is positively 
related to firm value but fail the test of significance even at 10 per cent. The interaction of earnings and corporate 
governance variables are negatively related to firm value, but not significantly so. Book value interaction with 
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independence and audit quality is negative in relationship with firm value, but interacting with structure, it is 
positive and not significant. Dividend interaction with corporate governance variables of independence and audit 
quality is positively related to firm value, but fail the test of significance at 10 per cent. While the interaction 
with structure dimension is negative and insignificant. All control variables are negatively related to firm value 
but fail the test of significance even at 10 per cent. The interaction of accounting variables with control variables, 
reveal that only the BVPS*GRW interaction is significant at 1 per cent. The adjusted R2 is 0.95, with DW stat at 
2.07 
 
4.3 Discussion of Results 
The value relevance of accounting information is the operationalisation of relevance a primary characteristics of 
accounting information. Value relevant accounting information is an attribute of quality of financial reporting. 
Market based accounting studies have focused on the role of accounting numbers in valuation. A lot of studies 
have utilised the Ohlson (1995) and the Feltham and Ohlson(1996) model with respect to valuation. Callen (2009) 
argues that almost all accounting valuation models are variants of the Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and 
Ohlson(1995,`1996) models. This according to Callen (2009) is motivated by the simplicity with which the 
models can be estimated. 
The Ohlson (1995) model shows that the market value of a share is a function of two bottom line measures 
in the financial statement – Earnings and Book value and other relevant information captured or not by the 
accounting system. In this study the basic Ohlson model is employed to ascertain the value relevance of 
accounting information, as well as variants of the model as revealed by existing literature. The study modifies 
the basic Ohlson model to include corporate governance variables, in order to determine the association between 
corporate governance and value relevance of accounting information. 
From the results of model1, 2 and 3 in which Earnings, Book value, cash flow from operations and dividend 
are explanatory variables for the dependent variable share price at 3months after year end, an overall evaluation 
of the results shows that earnings and book value are significant at 1 per cent in model 1. From model 2 in which 
cash flow is included they are all significant at 1 per cent.. From model 3, in which dividend is included we find 
that it is not significant under the estimation methods at 1%. Our finding are consistent with, Mungly et al (2016), 
Habib and Azim (2008) and Fiador (2010), who document the significance of earnings and book value. 
For corporate governance to be associated with value relevance of accounting information, the coefficient 
of accounting variables in the model 4, 5 and 6 are expected to be positive and significant.Model 4, 5 and 6 are 
variants of model 1, 2 and 3 in which the corporate governance variables which are the factor scores variables of 
STRUCTURE, INDEPENDENCE and AUDIT QUALITY are included. The coefficients of accounting 
information in model 4 are both positive but not significant. In model 5, the coefficients are positive and 
significant, while in model 6, the coefficients are positive and not significant. In order to corroborate these 
results, the adjusted R2 from model 1,2 and 3 are compared with that of model 4, 5 and 6. There is no significant 
difference in adjusted R2 between model 1 and model 4; between model 2 and model 5; and between model 3 
and model 6. We find therefore that corporate governance does not lead to higher value relevance of accounting 
information. We note however that models 4,5 and 6 would not validate or confirm the interaction effect of 
corporate governance with accounting information.  
In order to ascertain how accounting information links up to firm value in the context of corporate 
governance, the measures of corporate governance are interacted with accounting information in model 7, 8 and 
9. These models are variants of the basic model 1, 2 and 3. The effect of better corporate governance should lead 
to stronger relationship between accounting information and firm value (share price). This is determined by the 
coefficients in model 7, 8 and 9. Where they are positive and significant we can infer that corporate governance 
leads to stronger association between accounting information and firm value. In model 7, only the coefficient of 
book value is positive and significant at 5 per cent, while earnings is not. We also find that the interaction of 
earnings and audit quality (EPS*AQ) is positive and significant at 5 per cent. While the interaction of book value 
and independence (BVPS*STR) is positive and significant at 1 per cent. The adjusted R2 of model 7 is 0.62, 
which is significantly higher than that of model 1. The inference is that the corporate governance results in 
stronger association between firm value and accounting information. The results of model 8 is compared with 
that of model 2. In model 8 CFOPS has positive and significant coefficient, but earnings and book value are not 
significant though have positive coefficients. The interaction of BVPS*STR in model 8 has a positive and 
significant coefficient at 5 per cent level. This result is consistent with Habib and Azim (2008). The adjusted R2 
from model 8 is compared with that of model 2, we find that model 8 has adjusted R2 of 0.63 compared with 
0.54 of model 2. The regression results of model 9 is compared with that of model 3. We find that the adjusted 
R2 of model 9 is 0.63 which is higher than that of model 3 at 0.54. The coefficient of accounting information in 
this model though positive are not all significant. Only the book value passes the test of significance at 5 per cent. 
In the interaction of corporate governance variables with accounting variables, we find that EPS*AQ has a 
positive coefficient and it is significant at 5 per cent. BVPS*STR also has a positive coefficient and it is 
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significant at 1 per cent. From the foregoing it is evident that book value relevance is improved by corporate 
governance. 
In order to properly isolate the effect of corporate governance on the association between accounting 
information and firm value, the firm-characteristics in firm valuation should be controlled. As seen in model 10, 
11 and 12 firm specific factors significantly improved the explanatory power of the models. Comparing model 
10 to model 1, we find that the explanatory power has increased from 0.54 to 0.94, while the comparison of 
model 11 to model 2 shows that explanatory power has increased from 0.57 to 0.94 and that of model 12 
compared to model 3 moves from 0.53 to 0.94. The regression results from model 13, 14 and 15 shows the effect 
of corporate governance on the association of accounting information and firm value while controlling for firm-
specific factors. Comparing the results of model 10 to model 13, we find that the adjusted R2 moves marginally 
from 0.94 to 0.945. The coefficient of accounting variables in this model while being positive do not pass the test 
of significance at prescribe levels. Controlling for firm-specific variables does not lead to stronger association 
between accounting information and firm value given the level corporate governance in sample firms. The 
results of model 14 shows also that there is no significant increase in the explanatory power of model 14 relative 
to model 11 after controlling for firm-specific factors. The adjusted R2 from model 14 is 0.94 and that of model 
11 is also 0.94. The coefficient of accounting variables of earnings and cash flow are negative, meaning that 
corporate governance does not lead to stronger association of accounting information and firm value. Though the 
coefficient fails the test of significance at a liberal 10 per cent. The analysis of model 15 and model 12 shows 
that there is no significant improvement in the explanatory power of model 15 over model 12. The adjusted R2 of 
model 15 is 0.944 while that of model 12 is 0.94. The coefficient of accounting variables in model 15 are 
positive but fail the test of significance at 10 per cent.  
 
5. CONCLUSION. 
This paper investigated the effect of corporate governance on the value relevance of accounting information for 
listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange, from 2008 to 2015. The primary motivation of this study is place of 
corporate governance in the Nigerian capital market. Corporate governance has been linked to the spate of 
banking crisis in Nigeria. The quality of accounting information against the back ground of poor corporate 
governance has been queried. Using a sample of listed non-financial firms from 2008 to 2015 we provide 
evidence that corporate governance does to lead to stronger association of accounting information and firm value.  
Using the basic Ohlson (1995) model and variants which include cash flow from operation and dividends, 
we integrate principal component analysis factor of corporate governance variables into the model. We find that 
from the basic Ohlson (1995) we find earnings, book value and cash flow value relevant, but dividends not 
significantly associated with share values. Including the corporate governance variables, we find that earnings, 
book value and cash flow positively associated with share price, but fail the test of significance. The implication 
therefore is that the present state of corporate governance has not resulted in stronger association of accounting 
information and share price. In order to give the findings robustness, we control for firm-specific characteristics 
of loss, size, growth and leverage. We find that these firm specific features lead to stronger value relevance of 
accounting information compared to corporate governance variables. 
The result of this study implies that for practitioners, there is the need to avail other sources of information 
for investment decision making, as the state of corporate governance has not resulted in more value relevant 
accounting information for listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The concern of relevant stakeholders as 
to the quality of corporate governance is justified by empirical evidence provided by this study. Consequently 
regulatory authorities and other interest groups must endeavor to improve the quality of corporate governance as 
it has implication for the relevance of accounting information available to investors. 
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   Mean  Median  Maximum  MIN  Std. Dev. J-B Prob 
BDSIZE 8.862573 9 16 3 2.474824 12.23 0.0022 
NEXBD 5.982456 6 12 1 2.023248 5.11 0.0778 
BDSH 68,208,044 10,016,569 1,050,000,000 31,679 172,000,000 3921.00 0 
AUDCOM 5.538012 6 6 3 0.973258 72.45 0 
ACFL 0.584795 0 7 0 0.961183 1381.11 0 
EXAUDCOM 0.652047 1 3 0 0.630583 15.69 0.0004 
NEXAUDCOM 2.128655 2 4 0 0.758798 4.80 0.0909 
POLCON 0.961988 1 3 0 1.008041 31.38 0 
FRGBDM 2.207602 2 8 0 2.077854 29.19 0 
BDSHP 9.259854 1.595 80.31 0 18.07183 994.12 0 
BIND 0.681608 0.7 0.9 0.09 0.155801 30.40 0 
AUDFEE 14,162,818 5,750,000 200,000,000 2,450 28,245,326 8.76 0 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 




  EPS DPS CFOPS BVPS 
 Mean 1.984481 34.80058 3.166017 8.8544 
 Median 0.707808 0.117008 0.813454 4.35164 
 Maximum 51.32742 993.1865 45.68133 226.49 
 Minimum -19.97465 0 -9.902525 -34.039 
 Std. Dev. 5.505185 119.8149 6.211141 16.0493 
Skewness 5.675276 5.15378 3.259725 7.97314 
 Kurtosis 47.2159 32.65013 16.73308 102.193 
     
Jarque-Bera 29695.3 14041.6 3293.185 143832 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 
          
 
Table 3 Correlation matrix 
  STR  INDP  AQ  EPS  DPS  CFOPS  BVPS  LOSS  SIZE  GRW  DEBT  SHP1  
STR  1                       
INDP  -0.194 1.000                     
AQ  0.268 -0.213 1.000                   
EPS  0.149 -0.086 0.130 1.000                 
DPS  0.118 -0.125 0.135 0.266 1.000               
CFOPS  0.114 -0.100 0.179 0.464 0.350 1.000             
BVPS  0.189 -0.111 0.150 0.346 0.184 0.434 1.000           
LOSS  -0.020 0.006 -0.024 -0.036 0.001 0.057 0.079 1.000         
SIZE  0.032 0.031 0.028 0.316 0.254 0.432 0.474 0.378 1.000       
GRW  -0.143 0.063 -0.038 0.106 0.029 0.049 0.018 0.124 0.147 1.000     
DEBT  0.015 -0.003 0.025 0.255 0.487 0.295 0.225 0.187 0.475 0.094 1.000   
SHP1  0.210 -0.239 0.148 0.385 0.304 0.492 0.455 0.031 0.380 0.055 0.283 1.000 
 
Table 4 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
C 30.69 25.9 29.4 
  2.65*** 2.29*** 2.58*** 
EPS 2.86 2.07 2.77 
  4.30*** 3.14*** 4.15*** 
BVPS 0.92 0.69 0.914 
  3.77*** 2.9*** 3.75*** 
CFOPS 2.85   
  4.19***   
DPS 0.05 
  1.38 
Adj R2 0.532 0.567 0.533 
    
F-stat 130.6 111.05 98.7 
p-value 0 0 0 
    
D-W 1.86 1.84 1.86 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10 levels respectively 
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  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
C 32.12 27.27 31.17 
  (2.11)** 2.50*** (2.06)** 
EPS 2.06 1.84 2.55 
  -1.02 (2.79)*** -1.26 
BVPS 0.85 0.63 0.85 
  -1.81 (2.65)*** -1.8 
CFOPS 2.78   
  (4.80)***   
DPS 0.03 
  -0.54 
STR 7.11 10.7 7.43 
  -1.08 -1.17 -1.12 
INDP  -17.9 -16.2 -17.31 
  (-1.72) (6.30)*** -1.65 
AQ 30.96 25.67 29.29 
  (2.25)** -17.7 (2.15)** 
Adj R2 0.54 0.57 0.54 
F-stat 69.16 66.7 59.4 
p-value 0 0 0 
D-W 1.88 1.86 1.88 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10 levels respectively 
 
Table 6 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  Coefficient  t-stat coefficient  t-stat coefficient  t-stat 
Constant 23.3 -1.87 21.7 -1.67 23.4 (1.95)** 
EPS 1.9 -1.68 1.2 -1.12 2.05 -1.7 
BVPS 0.93 (1.98)** 0.71 -1.53 0.89 (1.92)** 
CFOPS 2.25 (1.53)**   
DPS 0.08 -1.32 
STR -10.31 (-1.22) -7.22 (-0.85) -8.63 (-1.02) 
INDP 7.17 -0.98 7.31 -1.04 4.97 -0.75 
AQ 38.7 (2.16)** 46.1 (2.44)** 36.4 (2.02)** 
EPS*STR -3.23 (-1.1) -2.54 (-0.75) -4.26 (-1.43) 
EPS*INDP -4.37 (-1.68) -2.34 (-1.24) -4.96 (-1.73) 
EPS*AQ 12.6 (1.84)** 9.91 -1.54 12.5 (1.94)** 
BVPS*STR 3.02 (2.64)*** 2.68 (2.31)** 3 (2.66)*** 
BVPS*INDP -1.13 (-1.40) -1.09 (-1.24) -1.31 (-1.41) 
BVPS*AQ -3.4 (-1.24) -1.58 (-0.44) -3.43 (-1.29) 
CFOPS*STR 0.5 -0.4   
CFOPS*INDP -1.44 (-1.14)   
CFOPS*AQ -5.98 (-1.42)   
DPS*STR 0.02 -0.01 
DPS*INDP 0.13 -1.16 
DPS*AQ -0.11 (-0.39) 
Adj R2 0.62 0.63 0.63   
F-stat 48.02 38.1 36.6   
p-value 0 0 0   
D-W 2   1.96   2.02   
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10 levels respectively 
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  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Constant  23.60  Constant  19.55  Constant  35.90  
  (1.83) (1.04) (1.34) 
EPS -1.16 EPS 3.62  EPS 5.81  
  (0.54) (1.19) (1.32) 
BVPS 0.89  BVPS 1.06  BVPS 0.98  
  (0.94) (0.73) (0.67) 
LOSS -11.80 CFOPS -1.83 DPS -0.02 
  (-2.32)** (-0.63) (-0.55) 
SIZE 0.45  LOSS -16.30 LOSS -11.18 
  (0.28) (-1.51) (-1.39) 
GRW -0.04 SIZE 1.41  SIZE -0.58 
  (-4.5)** (0.75) (-0.34) 
DEBT -41.80 GRW -0.06 GRW (0.04) 
  (-7.4)*** (-1.04) (-1.19) 
EPS*LOSS (2.52) DEBT -52.40 DEBT -56.45 
  (-1.97)** (-1.61) (-1.61) 
EPS*SIZE 0.01  EPS*LOSS -3.27 EPS*LOSS -2.87 
  (0.04) (-1.51) (-1.52) 
EPS*GRW (0.0017) EPS*SIZE -0.48 EPS*SIZE -0.76 
  (-0.13) (-1.21) (-1.37) 
EPS*DEBT 1.97  EPS*GRW -0.0015 EPS*GRW 0.00  
  (3.34)*** (-1.09) (0.79) 
BVPS*LOSS 0.59  EPS*DEBT -0.58 EPS*DEBT -0.71 
  (0.74) (-0.76) (-0.68) 
BVPS*SIZE (0.23) BVPS*LOSS 0.94  BVPS*LOSS 0.48  
  (-1.99)** (1.14) (0.69) 
BVPS*GRW 0.94  BVPS*SIZE -0.22 BVPS*SIZE -0.21 
  (51.27)*** (-1.07) (-1.08) 
BVPS*DEBT 1.68  BVPS*GRW 0.91  BVPS*GRW 0.88  
  (2.87)*** (14.5)*** (10.07)*** 
  BVPS*DEBT 1.14  BVPS*DEBT 1.20  
  (1.24) (1.24) 
  CFOPS*LOSS 1.32  DPS*LOSS 0.52  
  (0.71) (1.24) 
  CFOPS*SIZE 0.03  DPS*SIZE -0.005 
  (0.07) (-0.66) 
  CFOPS*GRW 0.02  DPS*GRW 0.0012  
  (1.18) (1.52) 
  CFOPS*DEBT 3.29  DPS*DEBT 0.05  
  (1.50) (1.15) 
Adj R2 0.94 0.94  0.94  
F-stat 368.2 285.7 282.10  
DW 1.82   2.09   2.07  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10 levels respectively 
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Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Variable Coefficient t-stat Variable Coefficient t-stat 
C 30.85 1.32 C 24.62 1.32 C 33.03 1.37 
EPS -7.80 -1.27 EPS -0.39 -0.13 EPS 4.41 1.08 
BVPS 1.54 1.06 BVPS 2.13 1.26 BVPS 1.48 1.08 
STR -2.01 -0.86 CFOPS -2.45 -0.90 DPS 0.02 0.44 
INDP 0.13 0.07 STR -4.11 -1.52 STR -1.96 -0.77 
AQ 3.41 0.57 INDP 0.32 0.17 INDP -1.40 -0.67 
EPS*STR 1.13 0.71 AQ 1.61 0.31 AQ 3.19 0.53 
EPS*INDP -2.41 -1.37 EPS*STR 0.14 0.10 EPS*STR -1.59 -0.79 
EPS*AQ 1.26 0.54 EPS*INDP -2.02 -1.48 EPS*INDP -0.94 -1.07 
BVPS*STR 0.43 1.30 EPS*AQ -0.92 -0.40 EPS*AQ -0.55 -0.28 
BVPS*INDP 0.08 0.43 BVPS*STR 0.64 1.57 BVPS*STR 0.77 1.61 
BVPS*AQ -0.33 -0.58 BVPS*INDP 0.08 0.41 BVPS*INDP -0.09 -0.53 
LOSS -12.70 -1.35 BVPS*AQ 0.63 0.99 BVPS*AQ -0.14 -0.26 
SIZE -0.56 -0.42 CFOPS*STR 0.06 0.25 DPS*STR -0.03 -0.98 
GRW -0.04 -1.15 CFOPS*INDP 0.03 0.12 DPS*INDP 0.03 1.41 
DEBT -47.87 -1.51 CFOPS*AQ -1.36 -1.20 DPS*AQ 0.03 0.83 
EPS*LOSS -3.44 -1.23 LOSS -15.81 -1.58 LOSS -10.94 -1.37 
EPS*SIZE 0.95 1.21 SIZE 0.51 0.40 SIZE -0.50 -0.35 
EPS*GRW 0.00 -1.29 GRW -0.07 -1.10 GRW -0.04 -1.20 
EPS*DEBT 2.92 1.47 DEBT -51.87 1.68* DEBT -52.68 -1.64 
BVPS*LOSS 0.74 0.91 EPS*LOSS -4.89 -1.47 EPS*LOSS -3.61 -1.41 
BVPS*SIZE -0.31 -1.29 EPS*SIZE 0.14 0.37 EPS*SIZE -0.53 -1.06 
BVPS*GRW 0.88 9.91*** EPS*GRW 0.00 -1.64 EPS*GRW 0.00 -0.20 
BVPS*DEBT 1.42 1.24 EPS*DEBT 0.10 0.14 EPS*DEBT -0.02 -0.02 
  BVPS*LOSS 1.08 1.28 BVPS*LOSS 0.42 0.60 
  BVPS*SIZE -0.32 -1.37 BVPS*SIZE -0.24 -1.28 
  BVPS*GRW 0.87 9.96*** BVPS*GRW 0.84 7.85*** 
  BVPS*DEBT 0.29 0.38 BVPS*DEBT 0.61 0.78 
  CFOPS*LOSS 1.32 0.67 DPS*LOSS 0.83 1.38 
  CFOPS*SIZE 0.11 0.37 DPS*SIZE -0.01 -1.04 
  CFOPS*GRW 0.02 1.26 DPS*GRW 0.00 1.74 
  CFOPS*DEBT 3.55 1.63* DPS*DEBT 0.05 1.67 
Adj R2 0.94 0.95 0.95   
F-stat 211 184 177   
DW 2.06     2.11     2.07   
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10 levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
